讲座主题：Information Provision For Rewards-Based Crowdfunding Under Competition
主讲人：薛巍立 教授 东南大学
摘要：This paper investigates the information provision strategy by price signaling for an entrepreneur who designs a reward based crowdfunding campaign for an innovation product facing the potential risk being plagiarized. Specifically, we develop and analyze a two period game theoretic model with a creator, who initially shares his business campaign in a crowdfunding platform but can strategically release information about its product through price signaling, and an imitator, who begins developing a competing product as soon as it become aware of the creator’s product. We characterize the conditions under which the creator can signaling his product information. We find that the creator should strategically disclose his product quality information by trading off between the success in the crowdfunding stage and the competition intensity in the regular sale stage. Specifically, it is interesting to show that the creator with high quality can benefit by conceal its product quality information and mislead the imitator, while the one with low quality, on the contrary, may benefit if she discloses her product quality information. Moreover, we discuss how information asymmetry and signaling affect pricing decision by creators, quality decision by imitator, and consumer surplus when comparing to the result under full information.
主讲人简介: 薛巍立，东南大学经济管理学院教授、博导，国家自然科学基金优秀青年科学基金获得者，中国民主同盟中央青年委员会委员;目前为中国系统工程学会会员，物流系统工程专业委员会委员，中国自动化学会经济与管理系统专业委员会会员，中国管理现代化研究会运作管理专业委员会会员等。 本科与硕士均毕业于南京大学数学系，博士毕业于香港中文大学系统工程与工程管理系，主要从事供应链物流管理、数据驱动的决策优化、服务运营管理等。发表SCI/SSCI论文20多篇，包括 Operations Research、Production and Operations Management、Transportation Science等国际知名期刊;主持了多项国家级及省部级科研项目等等。